Decentralisation by Force: The United League of Arakan/ Arakan Army's Expansion in Western Myanmar

BACKGROUND

The Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA) is now the main political authority in western Myanmar. The key territory claimed by the ULA/ AA is Rakhine State, which has an estimated population of between one and two million people.³ To the west, Rakhine State faces the Bay of Bengal and has a short international border with Bangladesh, marked by the Nat River. The Rakhine Roma, or Arakan Mountain Range forms a border with central Myanmar. The ULA/AA has also seized territory in the militarily important Paletwa Township⁴ in southern Chin State, which shares a border with northeast lndia.⁵ Other ethnic Chin armed and political groups administer other portions of Paletwa. 

Rakhine State is best understood in three parts - northern, central and southern Rakhine. The north, bordering Bangladesh, has historically had a large Rohingya Muslim population and has been the site of repeated displacement into Bangladesh. Central Rakhine represents the 'Rakhine heartland' and is the state's main rice-producing region. It encompasses the modern state capital Sittwe as well as the ancient capitals of the Arakanese Kingdom, including Mrauk-U. 

It is majority ethnic Rakhine, but also home to a sizeable minority Rohingya Muslim population. Southern Rakhine State is also majority ethnic Rakhine but has historically had strong social links to lower Myanmar. Political parties dominated by ethnic Burmese members have typically had more success here than in central and northern Rakhine, although the 2020 elections were marked by greater successes for ethnic Rakhine parties. There are also other, less populous ethnic groups living in areas across Rakhine State, including the Maramargyi, Chin, Mro, Thet, Khami, Burmese, Kaman, and others.⁶ 

Successive central Myanmar governments have invested few resources in developing Rakhine State. In 2017, the World Bank reported that 78% of Rakhine State's population lived below the poverty line, with per capita GDP 25% less than the national average.⁷ A widespread sense of neglect among ethnic Rakhine people underpins strong popular support for the ULA/ AA. The refusal by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) government in 2016 to allow the leading ethnic Rakhine political party - which had won a majority of seats in the state parliament - the opportunity to appoint the Rakhine State Chief Minister further strengthened popular perceptions that political channels had failed and armed resistance was necessary to achieve representation. 

Since launching a new offensive against the MAF in November 2023,⁸ the ULA/AA has occupied nearly all of Rakhine State. The MAF only remains in three small areas: the state capital Sittwe, the Chinese investment hub of Kyaukpyu, and the small island township of Man Aung.⁹ Although this territory is limited, Sittwe and Kyaukpyu are critical for administration and foreign investment. Meanwhile, MAF airstrikes and drone attacks target ULA/ AA administrators and infrastructure elsewhere, posing a constant and significant challenge to the ULA/ AA's ability to stabilise its control and deliver services.¹⁰ 

The ULA/ AA faces the enormous task of rehabilitating its territory following a war which continues to impose massive humanitarian cost. Due to cycles of violence since 2012, approximately 467,500 people are internally displaced, while more than one million refugees languish in camps in Bangladesh. A further 150,000 have arrived in Bangladesh since the ULA/ AA launched its offensive in northern Rakhine in 2024.¹¹ Schools, hospitals, electricity and other infrastructure have been damaged or destroyed, and landmines and unexploded ordnance pose a constant threat to farmers in many areas. Agriculture is western Myanmar's key economic activity, but access to farmland and agricultural inputs has been disrupted and yields are minimal. The MAF's blockade on trade from central Myanmar has further limited access to food. In November 2024, UNDP warned of the "imminent threat of acute famine" because of repeated shocks and restrictions on the import of essential goods including food and medicine.¹² However, expansion of trade between Northeast India and ULA/ AA-controlled Rakhine has mitigated the worst impacts. Food, petrol, medicine and other goods imported from India now fill markets. However, the economic and livelihoods crisis in western Myanmar means that many products are still expensive for households and resiliencies are stretched. 

³ There are no up-to-date population figures for Rakhine State, in part because the Rohingya were excluded from Myanmar’s 2014 census, and in part because of the substantial displacement from and within Rakhine State since 2012. However, in 2025, Crisis Group estimated that the total population may be as low as 1 million people, citing mass exodus as a result of the war. International Crisis Group, Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency, 18 June 2025, available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar-bangladesh/348-bangladeshmyanmar-dangers-rohingya-insurgency.

⁴ In 2014, the population of Paletwa was reported to be 64,971. Government of Myanmar, The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census: Chin State Census Report Volume 3-D, Department of Population, 2015 available from: https://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Chin%20State%20Census%20Report%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf.

⁵ The ULA/AA is not the only political authority active in Paletwa Township; Chin groups administer portions of the township.

⁶ Christopher Win, “The hidden plight of Myanmar’s double minorities,” Frontier Myanmar, 4 April 2023, available from: https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-hidden-plight-of-myanmars-double-minorities/

⁷ World Bank Group, The World Bank and Myanmar’s Rakhine State, 12 June 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2019/06/12/the-world-bank-and-myanmars-rakhine-state.

⁸ The escalation took place as part of a larger offensive led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, named ‘Operation 1027’ after the date it commenced: 27 October 2023. The offensive in western Myanmar started two weeks later.

⁹ A large Rohingya presence in Sittwe, and international investment in both Sittwe and Kyaukpyu may slow offensives against these two positions. According to reports, China has recently deployed private security firms to Kyaukpyu to protect its investments there, https://www.facebook.com/share/1BjGV7B97S/?mibextid=wwXIfr

¹⁰ Morgan Michaels, “Crossing the Rubicon: Are Myanmar’s ethnic armies prepared to go all in?,” International Institute for Security Studies, February 2025, available from: https://myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2025-02.

¹¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Operational Data Portal, available from: https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/mmr [accessed 3 November 2025]; UNHCR, UNHCR: Bangladesh has welcomed 150,000 Rohingya refugees in last 18 months, 11 July 2025, available from: https://www.unhcr.org/co/europe/sa/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-bangladesh-has-welcomed-150-000-rohingya-refugees-last-18-months. In a recent interview, the ULA/AA leader claimed that some of the refugees had since returned and resettled in northern Rakhine.

¹² UNDP, Rakhine: A Famine in the Making, United Nations Development Programme, 7 November 2024, available from: https://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/publications/rakhine-a-famine-in-the-making.

¹³ BBC News Myanmar, Interview with Twan Mrat Naing, 2 February 2024, available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dIX8mcQzVQ.

UNDERSTANDING THE UNITED LEAGUE OF ARAKAN / ARAKAN ARMY 

The AA was formed in 2009 in northern Myanmar under the tutelage of the Kachin Independence Organisation/ Army (KIO/ A). The AA recruited members not only from Rakhine State, but also from the jade mines and banana plantations of northern Myanmar, where many young Rakhine people had come to work in challenging and often dangerous conditions due to the unavailability of jobs in Rakhine State. Having established a policy of conscription in early 2025, the ULA/ AA claims to now have at least 40,000 armed members, which would make it one of the largest ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar.¹³ 

The ULA/AA's core ideology is ethnic nationalism and self-determination. Since 2019, the ULA/ AA has made it clear that it is working toward a 'confederation' - a greater level of autonomy than federalism but stopping short of complete political independence from Myanmar - and has made explicit comparisons to the autonomy held by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in northeast Myanmar. The ULA/AA has used the rallying calls 'Arakan Dream' and 'the way of Rakhita' to mobilise support but, strategically, has never defined these terms in detail.¹⁴ In a speech delivered in April 2020, ULA/AA leader Twan Mrat Naing described the Way of Rakhita as "the struggle for national liberation and the restoration of Arakan's sovereignty to the people of Arakan", pointing to the loss of Arakan's sovereignty to the Burmese Kingdom in 1784.¹⁵ According to its leadership, the ULA would govern as a 'vanguard' party in a 'unitary state'.¹⁶ This appears contrary to the federal democratic ambitions of most other resistance forces across Myanmar^.17 While political divergence has not inhibited military cooperation between the ULA/ AA and other forces opposing the MAF, it signals that future political convergence may prove challenging. 

The ULA/ AA has curated its public image carefully. Typically, only the top few leaders and an official spokesperson speak to the media, and formal statements are released by the ULA/ AA headquarters or its humanitarian wing, the Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO). This demonstrated expertise in strategic communications reflects not only a deep understanding of its audiences, but also a high-level of centralisation and internal control of information. 

A key challenge for the ULA/ AA is overcoming decades of tension and violent division between diverse communities in western Myanmar, particularly those between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities. The ULA/AA has explicitly promoted the idea of an inclusive and multi-ethnic 'Arakan' and has undertaken activities in the name of communal harmony, for example, by setting up communal harmony committees and organising inclusive football matches and other sporting events.¹⁸ In a December 2024 statement, the ULA/ AA described itself as:

  a political organization engaged in an armed struggle for the national equality of all ethnic groups within the Arakan region and their liberation from the oppressive rulers.¹⁹ 

But the ULA/ AA's stated policy has not always translated into practice. Cracks appeared in the ULA/AA's usually polished communications in March 2024, when ULA/AA leader Twan Mrat Naing posted several Tweets on Twitter (X) referring to the Rohingya as 'Bengalis' - a divisive term which the ULA/AA had previously refrained from using, and which many Rohingya interpret to mean they are unwelcome foreigners. The social media posts followed reports that some Rohingya men had joined the MAF to fight against the ULA/AA, following the MAF's February 2024 enactment of a conscription law. While some Rohingya were forcibly recruited, others reportedly joined 'voluntarily' or under inducement including offers of citizenship.²⁰ The result has been heightened tensions between the ULA/AA and Rohingya, violence against civilians and civilian property in northern Rakhine State, and allegations of increased ULA/ AA repression against the Rohingya.²¹ 

In June 2025, the ULA/AA's top leader Twan Mrat Naing arrived in Rakhine State, in what is believed to be his first visit to the region since the AA's formation. The ULA/AA's leadership had previously been based outside their claimed homeland -a unique dynamic among Myanmar's ethnic armed organisations. The symbolic homecoming has potentially wide-ranging implications. It signals greater engagement by top leadership in day-to-day governance; an attempt to look west to India and Bangladesh to balance against Chinese influence; and a show of solidarity with the people of western Myanmar during a time of immense hardship. 

¹³ BBC News Myanmar, Interview with Twan Mrat Naing, 2 February 2024, available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dIX8mcQzVQ.

¹⁴ iPG, An Analysis on the Current and Future Political Landscape of Arakan, Institute for Peace and Governance (iPG), July 2022, available from: 13 BBC News Myanmar, Interview with Twan Mrat Naing, 2 February 2024, available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dIX8mcQzVQ..

¹⁵ Arakan Army, Speech by Commander-In-Chief at 11TH anniversary day of arakan army (sic), 11 April 2020, available from: 13 BBC News Myanmar, Interview with Twan Mrat Naing, 2 February 2024, available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dIX8mcQzVQ..

¹⁶ Myo Min, “Anything Other than the Sit-Tat,” Tea Circle, 29 October 2024, available from: 13 BBC News Myanmar, Interview with Twan Mrat Naing, 2 February 2024, available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dIX8mcQzVQ..

¹⁷ Ardeth M. Thawnghmung & Ashley South, “Revolutionary Regimes: Emerging Forms of Governance in Post-Coup Myanmar,” Trends in Southeast Asia, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Issue 4, 2025, available from: 13 BBC News Myanmar, Interview with Twan Mrat Naing, 2 February 2024, available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dIX8mcQzVQ..

¹⁸ COAR, A Governance Tapestry: Layered Administrations and Revolutionary Service Delivery in Western Myanmar, Centre for Operational Analysis and Research, 2022, available from: https://www.coar-global.org/2023/09/27/a-governance-tapestry-layered-administrations-and-revolutionary-service-delivery-in-western-myanmar/.

¹⁹ United League of Arakan, Statement No. (18/2024), 29 December 2024, https://www.arakanarmy.net/post/statement-11.

²⁰ MD. Himmel Rahman, “Myanmar: The junta’s forced conscription of Rohingyas,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 2 April 2024, available from: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-junta-s-forced-conscription-rohingyas.

²¹ International Crisis Group, “Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” International Crisis Group, 27 August 2024, available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/339-breaking-away-battle-myanmars-rakhine-state.

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND SERVICE DELIVERY 

The AA formed its political wing, the ULA, in 2016, indicating its growing governance ambitions, and has since established a formal administration in Rakhine State, the Arakkha People’s Revolutionary Government.

The ULA/AA’s high-level decision-making structures are somewhat opaque but are dominated by ethnic Rakhine men. Decisions at the highest levels are made jointly by the top five leaders who hold leadership positions in the ULA and/or AA. The ULA and AA share a common leadership in Twan Mrat Naing, but subsequent levels of its hierarchy have a greater distinction between military and civilian roles. In the current reality of ongoing conflict, military leaders on the ground hold more authority than civilian leaders.

Militarily, the ULA/AA divides its territory into a system of three military regions, known as Alpha, Victor and Nova. Each is split into three or four sub-units. Administratively, the ULA/AA uses the same 17 townships of Rakhine State as central Myanmar authorities but have also designated southern Chin States’s Paletwa as an administrative unit.

Due to the ongoing war footing and campaign to take control of the entire Rakhine State, the ULA/AA generally prioritises its military ambitions. However, it has also invested significantly in service delivery to communities. During a period of parallel administration between 2019 and 2023, the ULA/AA siphoned resources from the central Myanmar state towards its own services delivery. Government judges moonlit in ULA/AA courts, and Naypyitaw-funded schools operated under AA flags, where teachers paid taxes to the ULA.²² As the MAF lost territory in western Myanmar in late 2023 and 2024, it ceased funding services in most locations and complete responsibility fell to the ULA/AA.

The ULA/AA’s strongest service may be its justice department, which it prioritised following the establishment of its administration in 2019. Justice was an area in which the ULA/AA could quickly expand with minimal investment, and the public welcomed an alternative to the state’s corrupt and inefficient court system. The ULA/AA runs hospitals and clinics, although suffers a shortage of doctors. Some level of informal education is provided by individuals and organisations linked to the ULA/AA, but the ULA/AA does not run formal schooling. To govern the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance, the ULA/AA established the Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO) in 2022. The ULA/AA is reportedly preparing for a greater roll-out of services.

The ULA/AA has no shortage of willing volunteers offering support in administration and service delivery. However, skills and technical capabilities are in short supply, due to decades of underdevelopment and weak governance. International and local aid agencies note a lack of capacity in the ULA/AA’s humanitarian and development aid permission system, where the flow of information is inconsistent and sometimes disrupts much-needed aid operations.²³ The ULA/AA has relied on civil servants and administrators who left the previous state bureaucracy, and this provides a baseline of knowledge and ability. However, these individuals also bring ingrained habits of corruption and mentalities which will be challenging to unroot, especially while the ULA/AA’s administration cannot afford to pay adequate salaries. While the ULA/AA’s judiciary has had some success in reducing corruption in that sector, reports suggest it remains difficult to stamp out entirely.²⁴

²² COAR, A Governance Tapestry: Layered Administrations and Revolutionary Service Delivery in Western Myanmar, Centre for Operational Analysis and Research, 2022, available from: https://www.coar-global.org/2023/09/27/a-governance-tapestry-layered-administrations-and-revolutionary-service-delivery-in-western-myanmar/.

²³ Authors’ interviews with local and international aid agencies, August and September 2025.

²⁴ CAS, Alternative Justice: Analyzing the ULA’s Legal System in Arakan, 7 November 2024, available from: https://arakanstudies.org/ibr/24/04/CAS-ULA-Judical%20System-Arakan-Oct-2024.pdf

FINANCING THE REVOLUTION

Like all ethnic armed organisations/political authorities in Myanmar, the ULA/AA’s revenue streams are opaque and likely derive from a range of sources. In the early years, the ULA/AA relied heavily on donations from the diaspora and migrant workers abroad. Support from allied ethnic armed organisations also likely contributed to revenue streams, including economic opportunities in resource extraction in Kachin and Shan states.

Taxation has expanded alongside the ULA/AA’s growing footprint in western Myanmar. Initially, taxation only targeted businesses but has now expanded to the household level. There is concern that household taxes may put unreasonable strain on households in the current context of extreme hardship and displacement. Unregulated resource extraction may also prove unsustainable, as reserves are limited and the environmental impacts potentially damaging.

Western Myanmar’s most valuable natural resources are its offshore oil and gas reserves. Key oil and gas facilities in Kyaukpyu remain under the control of Naypyitaw. However, much of the oil and gas pipelines, which extend from Kyaukpyu through Myanmar to southern China, flows through territory now held by the ULA/AA. Even if the ULA/AA is able to seize the remainder of Kyaukpyu, developing sustainable revenue streams will likely require technical capacities only accessible through international trade and investment – but this will require a greater level of stability and formal recognition of the ULA/AA’s administration.

Some of the ULA/AA’s allies in northern Myanmar have longstanding and well-documented involvement in the production and trade of illicit drugs. Shan State is the world’s leading source of opium and methamphetamines, both in tablet and crystal form, which is exported to the region and beyond. A portion of this product is exported west, into Bangladesh and India. While there is no evidence that the ULA/AA as an organisation is directly involved in this trade, the movement of illicit drugs into Bangladesh has continued since the ULA/AA took control of territory along the border. The ULA/AA has consistently denied allegations made by the MAF that it is involved in the trade.²⁵

The revenue streams of any political authority can have implications for its political development and responsiveness to community needs. If external revenue streams are sufficiently lucrative, then the leadership may find they have fewer incentives to respond to community needs and provide effective services. 

²⁵ Lu Htet Naing, “ULA/AA: Junta's claim linking captured drugs with AA is utterly unfounded and purely a political smear,” Narinjara, 21 March 2025, available from: https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/67dc50dc4651bf3bea5be7d1.

THE ULA/AA: FROM CLIENT TO PATRON

Alliance building has been a critical part of the ULA/AA’s rise to become one of Myanmar’s most powerful armed and political actors. These alliances facilitate the ULA/AA’s presence in at least nine of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions, allowing it to claim perhaps the greatest geographical reach of any armed group in Myanmar apart from the MAF. The ULA/AA’s strongest relations are those with ethnic armed organisations along Myanmar’s northern border with China, which supported its rise or grew alongside it. Since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, it has emerged as a powerful sponsor of many newly formed armed groups opposing the MAF and has developed considerable leverage within the nationwide resistance as a result. On the other hand, geopolitical dynamics, territorial ambitions, and ethno-nationalist ideology have contributed to worsening relations with some armed groups in or adjacent to western Myanmar.

THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES

The ULA/AA has avoided any formal relationship with the National Unity Government (NUG), which presents itself as an alternative government to the MAF.²⁶ There are several stresses on the relationship. First, while the NUG speaks of federal democracy, the ULA/AA has emphasised confederacy and self-rule.The ULA/AA is also aware that China views the NUG with suspicion for its democratic and Western-oriented outlook, and this constrains the ULA/AA’s ability to engage. Finally, historical factors are important: the NUG is dominated by ethnic Burmese politicians, many of whom hail from the NLD, which publicly sided with the MAF against the ULA/AA prior to the 2021 coup.²⁷

Yet while the ULA/AA has minimised engagement with the NUG, it has expanded its alliance building beyond its traditional partners in Myanmar’s north, allowing it to secure what conflict monitoring group ACLED calls “operational depth, logistical flexibility, and access to arms and recruits”.²⁸ Since 2021, the ULA/AA has supported ethnic Burmese-led armed resistance groups, known variously as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) or local defence forces (LDFs), with trainings and battlefield assistance. Myanmar analytical group ISP has identified 23 distinct armed groups receiving some form of support from the ULA/AA.²⁹ These are often township-level armed groups, including groups affiliated to the NUG and others which have distanced themselves from it. This network of alliances provides a potential buffer zone around ULA/AA territory, and some LDFs have contributed troops to fight the MAF inside Rakhine State. North of Rakhine State, the ULA/AA has supported Chinland Defence Forces (CDFs) who have united under the banner of the Chinland Brotherhood. This collaboration is almost entirely military and does not involve discussions or planning for a future political arrangement, although it may have political implications. The ULA/AA’s support has been critical for some of these groups, and blood has been split for each other’s goals. The ULA/AA functions as a patron in many of these relationships and the leverage and influence they hold may manifest into future political settlements or other arrangements on the ULA/AA’s terms.

KEY ALLIES

The ULA/AA’s longest standing and most important alliances are with ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar’s north, where the ULA/AA was originally founded and matured. As a result of geographical, economic and historical ties, China has significant influence over most ethnic armed organisations along its border, but these groups should not be seen as proxies of China. Together with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the ULA/AA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which received some level of Chinese support for its ‘Operation 1027’ escalation in late 2023. The ULA/AA is also a member of the Northern Alliance, which includes the Three Brotherhood Alliance groups together with the KIO/A; and of the seven-member Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee (FPNCC), which was formed at China’s urging in 2017 to take part in peace negotiations with the MAF.³⁰ As the youngest partner in these alliances, the ULA/AA gained valuable tutelage and battlefield experience in northern Myanmar before moving its focus to the west.

The UWSA is a critical patron for these northern groups. Likely the largest and best-armed ethnic armed group in Myanmar, it has controlled a near-complete autonomous territory on the Myanmar-China border since the early 1990s. ULA/AA leaders have often resided in its territory. While the UWSA has historically used its position to channel arms and other support to its allies in Myanmar, in August 2025 the UWSA announced that due to Chinese pressure it would no longer provide such assistance.³¹ This forms part of a critical transformation in Myanmar’s conflict since 2024, in which China has increasingly shifted its weight behind the MAF and encouraged northern ethnic armed organisations to deescalate and negotiate ceasefires.

RIVAL GROUPS

ULA/AA relations with some Chin and Rohingya armed groups have proven mutually antagonistic, largely due to competing territorial claims and the ULA/AA’s ethno-nationalist ideology.

Since the AA’s arrival in Paletwa, southern Chin State, in the 2010s, the ULA/AA and the longstanding ethnic Chin armed organisation, the Chin National Front (CNF) have had a tense relationship marked by overlapping territorial claims and CNF allegations of ULA/AA abuses towards civilians. From 2014, reports emerged of AA abuses towards Khumi Chin civilians, including forced portering, forced labouring, and disappearances or detention of civilians.³² While both the ULA/AA and CNF are prioritising their military ambitions against the MAF for the time being, the question of Paletwa remains highly contentious. Since the arrival of ULA/AA leader Twan Mrat Naing in the region in 2025, there are indications that relation between the ULA/AA and local Chin armed groups in Paletwa have improved to some degree. However, this does not seem to extend to improved relationships between the ULA/AA and the Chinland Council or CNF.

Contention between the CNF and ULA/AA is compounded by the ULA/AA’s support for the Chin Brotherhood (CB). The CB and CNF have had disagreements over the political future of Chin State, and these have resulted in military confrontations. The CNF sees the ULA/AA’s support for the CB as interference in Chin affairs and has accused it of driving a wedge through Chin society.³³ In February 2025, the CB and CNF agreed on a merger, but its implementation has been challenging and the groups remain polarised. The ULA/AA’s involvement is just one factor in this complex dispute.

The presence and activities of Rohingya armed groups along the Rakhine State-Bangladesh border is another serious challenge to the ULA/AA’s ability to stabilise its administration and achieve local and international legitimacy. The MAF has, by design, left a legacy of intercommunal tension in northern Rakhine. Tensions between the ULA/AA and Rohingya communities escalated in April 2024, when Rohingya members of the MAF – forcibly conscripted or otherwise – looted and burnt down some 2,400 structures in the ethnic Rakhine quarter of Buthidaung town, reportedly joined by Rohingya armed groups. The following month AA members burnt down a reported 8,500 structures across around 50 Rohingya villages, as well as Rohingya areas of Buthidaung after they seized the town.³⁴ Compared to the AA, the Rohingya armed groups are far less sophisticated militarily but can draw on a captive displaced population in Bangladesh and make use of the porous border. Rohingya armed groups have gained strength and resources since early 2024, with some support provided by the MAF, and growing evidence of covert support from sections of the Bangladesh security and intelligence apparatus.³⁵

While the Rohingya armed groups may not be representative of Rohingya communities, they do embody popular discontent with the ULA/AA. Rohingya armed groups operate in civilian areas, and the ULA/AA has responded with suspicion and restrictions on the civilian population, which risks alienating the Rohingya further. There are also important international dynamics concerning the Rohingya. Bangladesh is Rakhine State’s closest neighbour and the return of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State is its key priority, as well as one which China has been active in working towards. For its part, the ULA/AA has repeatedly said it is in favour of the refugees’ return, when conditions are appropriate.³⁶ How the ULA/AA responds to Rohingya communities, and the insurgency threat, will have wide-ranging implications domestically and internationally. Attempting to suppress discontent through violence and repression will likely push greater numbers of discontented youth to resist and take up arms. In 2025, the ULA/AA has taken steps to recruit a greater number of Rohingya into its administration and armed wing, including its police service, although some of this recruitment takes place under the ULA/AA’s conscription policy. The ULA/AA’s highly publicised re-opening of the main mosque in Maungdaw, northern Rakhine, under the guidance of ULA/AA leader Twan Mrat Naing also represented an effort towards reconciling past wounds.

CIVIL SOCIETY

There are no formal accommodations for civil society groups in the ULA/AA’s political structures or decision-making processes. Despite this, ULA/AA has generally collaborative relations with civil society organisations in Rakhine State and most humanitarian relief is conducted by local organisations, with funds from international donors, local donors and the diaspora. Notably though, most civil society groups are rooted in ethnic Rakhine communities due to restrictions by successive Myanmar administrations on Rohingya organisation. Some civil society organisations have voiced concerns about the ULA/AA’s reluctance to allow them to conduct independent human rights monitoring and documentation.

ARAKAN'S PLACE IN THE BAY: CHINA, BANGLADESH, INDIA AND ASEAN

Rakhine State has long been a site of competition for regional powers, and the ULA/AA is now embroiled in a complex geopolitical game. The ULA/AA’s most critical international relationship is with China, which holds unrivalled influence over the group. As noted elsewhere, China is critical for the ULA/AA. As a result of China’s shifting approach to Myanmar, two of the ULA/AA’s main allies have entered into ceasefires with the MAF. In January 2025, the MNDAA signed a Chinese-brokered ceasefire with the MAF, and the TNLA followed suit in October 2025 following a series of military defeats.³⁷ However, China’s shifting position is unlikely to be permanent, and China is likely to continue to engage with a range of stakeholders and monitor the extent to which the MAF is able to successfully stabilise conditions along the shared border. The ULA/AA has learnt important lessons from its allies in northern Myanmar and has sought to diversify its international relations to avoid falling under the excessive influence of one neighbour.

Geography is an advantage for the ULA/AA, and the proximity of Bangladesh and India is an opportunity to balance foreign relations. The ULA/AA’s proven ability to capture – and to hold – territory in western Myanmar has shifted the calculations of neighbouring states. Formal recognition of the ULA/AA is unlikely anytime soon. Bound by the norms of international diplomacy and unwilling to create precedent, governments in New Delhi and Dhaka face the dilemma of how to maintain state-to-state relations with the MAF in Naypyidaw while dealing with the new authorities on their doorsteps. Both have stakes in western Myanmar. New Delhi seeks to balance Chinese influence and has investments in Rakhine, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Link – a corridor which connects Sittwe to India’s underdeveloped Northeast. Bangladesh’s priority is the return of the one million Rohingya refugees. The ULA/AA is now critical for all these projects.

To offset MAF blockades on trade from central Myanmar, disruption to agricultural cycles, and the resultant shortages of basic commodities, the ULA/AA has attempted to prioritise trade with its neighbours. Trade between Northeast India and western Myanmar has expanded dramatically since 2024, and while high transportation costs are passed on to consumers, goods now fill markets in many parts of Rakhine State and southern Chin. Movement across this border is largely free and markets in southern parts of India’s Mizoram State are reportedly buzzing with traders moving items into western Myanmar.³⁸ While media reports have indicated that the ULA/AA seeks to regulate movement, little is in place beyond taxation.³⁹ Central Indian authorities in New Delhi have said they will build a border fence and withdraw the Free Movement Regime they have maintained at the Myanmar border for decades.⁴⁰ However, there are substantial barriers to this. Local communities, traders and the Mizoram State government all appear to oppose the plan. The Mizoram authorities are particularly critical, as New Delhi relies on them as a bridge to engage armed actors in Myanmar.⁴¹

While the ULA/AA’s relationship with Indian authorities appears to be quietly going from strength to strength, its relationship with Bangladesh has deteriorated dramatically. Bangladesh had previously proposed a humanitarian corridor into Rakhine State, backed by the UN Secretary General. However, Dhaka’s relationship with the ULA/AA quickly fell apart. Following the fall of Sheik Hassina’s government in mid-2024, the positions of Bangladeshi security and intelligence services diverged from Dhaka, and some elements within those agencies provided support to armed Rohingya insurgencies to take on the ULA/AA. Following the ULA/AA’s reported violent targeting of Rohingya civilians, Dhaka’s insistence that the ULA/AA forge an inclusive administration and release a plan for the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees contributed to a further breakdown in negotiations.⁴² The relationship is now characterised by hostility and may only be corrected through a fresh approach following Bangladesh’s national elections, expected in February 2026.

Beyond these critical neighbours, other regional stakeholders are also worth noting. Former Japanese Special Envoy to Myanmar Yohei Sasakawa, who is also the head of the Nippon Foundation, acted as an intermediatory to broker ceasefires between the ULA/AA and MAF in the past. Regional multilateral body the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not engaged with the ULA/AA formally, but ASEAN’s mandate under the Five Point Consensus (5PC),⁴³ and channels for emergency aid may position it to take a greater role in the future. While these stakeholders do not hold as much sway as China or neighbouring countries, they may position themselves as useful balancers against those powers.

²⁶ The ULA/AA leadership has taken part in publicised meetings with the NUG, and the NUG donated funds to the ULA/AA for relief activities in the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha, which struck the coast of Rakhine State with devastating effect in May 2023. Border News Agency, “Assessing What is Happening in Arakan: One month after Cyclone Mocha”, Transnational Institute, 29 June 2023, available from: https://www.tni.org/en/article/assessing-what-is-happening-in-arakan.

²⁷ Morten B. Pedersen,, Outrage is not a policy: Coming to terms with Myanmar’s fragmented state, Lowy Institute, 12 May 2024, available from: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/outrage-not-policy-coming-terms-myanmar-s-fragmented-state; Htet Naing Zaw, “Gov’t Silent on Army’s Claim that Suu Kyi Wants AA ‘Crushed’,” The Irrawaddy, 21 January 2019, available from: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/govt-silent-armys-claim-suu-kyi-wants-aa-crushed.html.

²⁸ Su Mon, “From state to nation: The Arakan Army's ascent in post-coup Myanmar”, ACLED, 31 October 2025, available from: https://acleddata.com/actor-profile/state-nation-arakan-armys-ascent-post-coup-myanmar.

²⁹ ISP Myanmar, Rakhine: A De Facto Rival Power Center, ISP, 18 July 2025, available from: https://ispmyanmar.com/op-26/.

³⁰ The seven FPNCC members are the ULA/AA, KIO/A, TNLA, MNDAA, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or Mong La group, and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-South (SSPP/SSA-S).

³¹ The Irrawaddy, Under Chinese Pressure, Myanmar’s UWSP Cuts Off Support to Allied Ethnic Armies, 21 August 2025, available from: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/under-chinese-pressure-myanmars-uwsp-cuts-off-support-to-allied-ethnic-armies.html.

³² Lei Lei, “Ethnic Chin Armed Group Tells AA: Leave Chin State, End Fighting With Myanmar Military,” The Irrawaddy, 16 July 2020, available from: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/ethnic-chin-armed-group-tells-aa-leave-chin-state-end-fighting-with-myanmar-military.html.

³³ Lorcan Lovett, “Q&A: ‘The CNF will be abolished after the revolution’, says Chin leader Sui Khar,” Frontier Myanmar, 14 February 2025, available from: https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/qa-the-cnf-will-be-abolished-after-revolution-says-chin-leader-sui-khar/.

³⁴ Nathan Ruser, “They left a trail of ash: decoding the Arakan Army’s arson attacks in the Rohingya heartland,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 13 June 2024, available from: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/they-left-a-trail-of-ash-decoding-the-arakan-armys-arson-attacks-in-the-rohingya-heartland/.

³⁵ International Crisis Group, Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency, International Crisis Group, 18 June 2025, available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar-bangladesh/348-bangladeshmyanmar-dangers-rohingya-insurgency.

³⁶ International Crisis Group,, Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State,, 27 August 2024, available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/339-breaking-away-battle-myanmars-rakhine-state.

³⁷ Sebastian Strangio, Myanmar Rebel Group Agrees to Ceasefire With Military Ahead of Junta Election, The Diplomat, 30 October 2025, available from: https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/myanmar-rebel-group-agrees-to-ceasefire-with-military-ahead-of-junta-election/.

³⁸ Authors’ interview with Mizoram resident, August 2025.

³⁹ Authors’ interview with businessperson, October 2025; Authors’ interview with trader, central Rakhine State, October 2025.

⁴⁰ Kaushik, K & Agarwala, T, India to end free movement policy with Myanmar for 'internal security', Reuters, 8 February 2024, available from: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-interior-ministry-recommends-suspending-free-movement-with-myanmar-2024-02-08/.

⁴¹ Authors interview with businessperson, Kyauktaw town, October 2025; Angshuman Choudhury, “Northeastern View: What Mizoram CM’s statement on Chin-Rakhine relations tells us about the crisis in western Myanmar,” Hindustan Times, 12 September 2024, available from: https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/northeastern-view-what-mizoram-cm-s-statement-on-chin-rakhine-relations-tells-us-about-the-crisis-in-western-myanmar-101726145294646.html.

⁴² International Crisis Group, Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency, Crisis Group, 18 June 2025, available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar-bangladesh/348-bangladeshmyanmar-dangers-rohingya-insurgency.

⁴³ The 5PC, adopted by ASEAN leaders in April 2021, outlines a framework for resolving the political crisis in Myanmar, including an immediate end to violence, dialogue among all parties, a special envoy, humanitarian assistance, and the envoy's visit to Myanmar. Progress on implementing the 5PC has been slow.

CONCLUSION

The crisis in Western Myanmar has transformed dramatically, but there are few indicators of stability. Decades of neglect by central authorities are compounded by the devastation of war and economic breakdown. While the ULA/AA has achieved asounding military success, it is unable to effectively defend its territory against MAF aerial attacks. Rohingya armed groups operating along the Bangladesh border, and the ULA/AA’s prior violence against Rohingya communities, undermine both everyday security and the ULA/AA’s ability to build trust with and among diverse communities. Limited capacities for governance and service delivery pose further challenges.

Yet, there are also opportunities. The ULA/AA has a high degree of public support and participation, at least from the majority ethnic Rakhine community. Unlike the MAF administration, the ULA/AA has a vested interest in development which benefits communities, not just elites. Western Myanmar’s coastal geography, natural resources and strategic geopolitical position all offer means to expand international engagement, diversity relations, and secure strategic supply chains and market linkages with neighbours. Looking west to expand existing trade routes with Northeast India and secure agricultural inputs may help communities recover agricultural cycles.

A longer-term return to stability in western Myanmar will require a sustainable political solution, and this depends in part on the complex mosaic of conflicts which currently embroil Myanmar. To date, the ULA/AA has approached relations with the MAF pragmatically and struck informal ceasefire deals in 2020 and 2022. In December 2024, following its capture of Rakhine State’s southernmost township, the ULA/AA issued a statement saying it was open to dialogue,⁴⁴ but the MAF did not respond and fighting continued. Nevertheless, as the ULA/AA continues to advance towards critical Chinese oil and gas investments in Kyaukpyu, China’s pressure on both sides to sign a ceasefire is likely to mount.

A new ceasefire would pose an opportunity for humanitarian support and some return to normalcy for communities in western Myanmar. However, bilateral deals have proven unsustainable in the past as they have been used by conflict parties to resupply and prepare for future offensives. Genuine peace and stability will require a multi-layered process in which the ULA/AA meaningfully engages with national-level authorities, Chin stakeholders and Rohingya communities and their representatives, to work jointly towards an inclusive system of governance in which all communities can participate.

⁴⁴ ULA, Statement (18/2024), United League of Arakan/Arakan Army website, 29 December 2024, available from: https://www.arakanarmy.net/post/statement-11.